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Author (up) Castanias, R.P.; Helfat, C.E. openurl 
  Title Managerial and Windfall Rents in the Market for Corporate Control Type Journal Article
  Year 1992 Publication Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Abbreviated Journal  
  Volume 18 Issue 2 Pages 153-184  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Address U CA, Davis; U PA  
  Keywords Personnel Management, executive compensation (M120); Corporate Finance and Governance: Other (G390); Business Economics: General (M200); Firm; Firms; Management  
  Abstract This paper examines the role of the top competent management team in generating firm and managerial rents, and draws implications for the market for corporate control. The analysis suggests that superior top managers have inherent incentives to act efficiently, and that the potential for conflict between manager and stockholder interests may be less than is often presumed. Rent-seeking behavior in the market for corporate control and its consequences are examined.  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN 0167-2681 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Tuck @ constance.helfat @ Serial 239  
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